Yesterday, a male prisoner serving a three-to-four-year sentence for drug offenses sued the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, demanding, among other things, that the state transfer him to a female correctional facility because he suffers from gender dysphoria.
In his lawsuit, filed by GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders under the pseudonym Jane Doe, Doe alleged violations of his federal and state constitutional rights to equal protection and due process, as well as his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act. All of Doe’s legal theories are dubious, but none so much as his disability claim under the ADA.
Passed in 1990, the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of a disability, and also requires employers and public entities — including prisons — to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled individuals. But in passing the ADA, Congress explicitly provided that “the term ‘disability’ shall not include (1) transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders.” And Doe’s complaint specifically says that his “doctor ultimately diagnosed Jane Doe with Gender Identity Disorder, or transsexualism.”
Given the clear statutory language, a court should quickly toss out Doe’s ADA claim. But that is not what happened the last time a man suffering from gender dysphoria brought a disability-discrimination claim under the ADA. Rather, when Kate Lynn Blatt sued his employer in 2014 under the ADA, the case lingered until May 2017, when federal district-court judge Joseph F. Leeson Jr. refused to dismiss the lawsuit, and instead held:
It is fairly possible to interpret the term gender identity disorders narrowly to refer to simply the condition of identifying with a different gender, not to exclude from ADA coverage disabling conditions that persons who identify with a different gender may have — such as Blatt’s gender dysphoria, which substantially limits her major life activities of interacting with others, reproducing, and social and occupational functioning.
The court’s reasoning is illogical: As Ed Whelan asked at the time, “We’re supposed to believe that it is ‘fairly possible’ to read gender identity disorders to mean only gender identity (‘identifying with a different gender’) and not to extend to disorders?” Because the parties in the Blatt case settled shortly after Judge Leeson refused to toss out the plaintiff’s case, a higher court will not have the opportunity to correct the district court’s flawed analysis.