Last week ex-CIA chief Michael Hayden signed a letter with a “bipartisan group of 115 national security leaders” that counsels the Trump administration and new National Security Advisor John Bolton not to jettison the nuclear deal with Iran. Hayden’s justification for this advice illustrates all the stale ideas and unexamined assumptions about foreign affairs that have brought us to this crisis in the first place––and why we need the return to realism we are likely to see with Bolton at the helm.
Hayden starts by admitting that the deal has problems. Iran was on the economic ropes because of the sanctions, and so should have been the “suppliant,” not us. Hayden’s delicate indirection refers to Obama’s shameful eagerness for a deal, any deal in fact, to burnish his foreign policy “legacy” and please the “international community” with his commitment to “multilateralism” and “smart diplomacy” instead of military power. Hayden also notes Obama’s “bait-and-switch when selling the deal to Congress,” a reference to the post facto concessions to the regime, like “abandoned or altered positions on no notice inspections,” which of course make the whole idea of monitoring Iran’s activities a mere aspiration.
Hayden also knows that Iran is a “bad actor.” But this vague cliché cannot accurately describe a repressive, brutal regime that has for nearly forty years soaked its hands in American blood, and now has replaced the U.S. as the dominant power in the Middle East. And it downplays Iran’s role in destabilizing the region as it creates a Shia crescent from Syria to Yemen, and builds a proxy attack-force on Israel’s borders in order to bring the mullahs closer to fulfilling their eschatological dream of “wiping Israel off the map.”
But the vagueness of “bad actor” allows Hayden to make an astonishing claim like this one: “Still, Iran is further away from a weapon with this agreement than they would be without it.” Apart from the either-or fallacy in believing that total war is the only alternative to a bad deal, what possible information does Hayden have that makes this credible? What empirical evidence can he produce to buttress the certainty of such a claim? By what means are the inspectors able to ascertain that Iran is in fact living up to the deal, or even to know the existence or location of all its nuclear development facilities? And what about the preposterous begged question in the letter’s claim that the “Iran will be prohibited from exceeding severe limits” by “continuing, unprecedented international monitoring”? How does “severe” square with the IAEA’s inability to monitor Iran’s compliance with Section T, which bans “activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device”?