The cost of assumptions: Iran, Oct. 7 and the power of a ‘conceptzia’ By David Isaac
https://www.jns.org/the-cost-of-assumptions-iran-october-7-and-the-power-of-a-conceptzia/
The IDF’s performance against Iran throws into sharp relief the difference a conceptzia can make. The same military that reeled against a Hamas onslaught on Oct. 7, 2023, acted with jaw-dropping efficiency 20 months later.
It was, in large part, due to the way the Israel Defense Forces viewed the threat from Iran vs. that from Gaza. Clear-eyed about the dangers from one, it was blinded by misconceptions about the other.
“When your enemies say something, they usually mean what they say. In Iran’s case, we understood that. In Hamas’s case, we did not,” Or Yissachar, director of research at the Israel Defense and Security Forum (IDSF), told JNS.
The conceptzia that misled the IDF about Hamas consisted of a series of governing assumptions: 1) Hamas had been deterred, particularly after 2021’s “Operation Guardian of the Walls”; 2) Hamas was contained—its rockets by the Iron Dome, its invasion tunnels by the “Iron Wall,” and 3) Hamas, preoccupied with governing Gaza, could be bought off.
“Hamas exploited that belief to conduct a years-long deception campaign, not only misleading Israel’s strategic planners but reinforcing the … conceptzia …, the outdated and unfounded assumptions that Hamas sought calm in exchange for economic relief,” John Spencer, chairman of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point, told JNS.
Compounding these assumptions was the belief that Hamas wasn’t capable of a major offensive. Israel believed it could mount a small raiding party at most. “It was a failure of imagination as much as it was a failure of preparation,” Spencer said.
The IDF, satisfied that Hamas didn’t constitute a real threat, neglected the southern border. “Israel barely collected intelligence on the group,” IDF Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, founder and chairman of the Israel Defense and Security Forum, told JNS.
Nor was the IDF properly deployed along the border. The security perimeter on the Gaza side gradually shrank as Gazans were permitted to approach the border fence. On the Israeli side, not enough reserve forces were kept in the rear, to be sent where needed in case of attack.
“You didn’t have a security perimeter, and all the Israeli forces were deployed along the border. This cannot work. This is not how you defend,” Avivi said. His explanation is that the IDF had become reliant on technology. “Technology can’t do a thing by itself. It’s one more layer. But it cannot replace how you are supposed to fight.”
The situation worsened as time went on. Spencer, who visited Israel, said that between 2021 and 2023, “civilian defensive readiness had relaxed. Firearms restrictions in many kibbutzim had been changed. Thousands of Gazans were permitted to enter southern Israel daily to work in agriculture.”
By “firearm restrictions,” Spencer referred to more stringent rules the IDF imposed on community security squads—rules on preventing weapons theft, rather than ensuring readiness. The rule change required all rifles and ammunition to be locked away in armories. When Hamas attacked on Oct. 7, many couldn’t access their weapons in time. In some cases, the terrorists knew where the armories were and who had the keys.
A notable exception was at Kibbutz Yad Mordechai, where the head of the security squad ignored the IDF’s orders and kept weapons dispersed to his team. His disobedience saved the kibbutz as the squad repelled the attackers.
Another example of the general decline in defensive posture was provided by journalist Jonathan Foreman in Commentary in May. He reported that IDF installations near Gaza abandoned the Western military practice of holding a “stand-to” before dawn. A stand-to is when soldiers practice taking up defensive positions in preparation for an enemy attack. It’s not clear when or why they stopped.
What transpired on Oct. 7 is well known. Hamas managed to surprise and overwhelm the Israeli forces at the border. Israel hadn’t enough reserves to throw them back. It took many hours before the IDF arrived in force. Avivi said that the IDF had always assumed it would take six hours to organize and move forces south. The problem, he said, is that “everything that happened on the 7th of October happened in the first six hours.”
The failure makes Israel’s performance against Iran all the more astonishing. Even Israel’s most determined enemies don’t dispute the efficiency of Israel’s military as its Air Force rapidly reduced Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile facilities over 12 days in June.
“When we put our minds to something, we are capable of doing amazing things. The last IDF chief of staff and General Staff were very focused on Iran and Lebanon. So many things were done well,” Avivi said. “But at the same time, they completely disregarded the ground forces, Gaza and other issues.”
Following the Iran attack, Israel’s army revealed it had determined in January 2023 that war with Iran was coming and that it would be a multi-front war. This doesn’t make sense to Avivi. “If Israel knew it was going to war, why didn’t it beef up its border?”
Avivi had been warning at that time that the military needed an overhaul. He wasn’t heeded. It’s an issue that goes to the heart of the problem, he says, describing a lecture he attended by the new head of the IDF’s Military Intelligence Directorate, Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder.
Binder gave an Oct. 7 post-mortem to former generals. “It sounded like a doctor talking about a patient whose entire system collapsed. I told him: ‘The one thing you didn’t do was describe the disease.’ And the disease is cultural,” Avivi said.
That cultural problem, in a word, is groupthink. The IDF promotes people who think alike. Prior to Oct. 7, only those focused on cutting-edge technology were promoted, distorting the IDF’s understanding of the problem in Gaza, and leading to a lack of readiness in equipment, munitions and forces, he said.
“When I, and other members of IDSF, talked about the need for more tanks and combat engineers, we were told we were behind the times,” Avivi said.
If the problem isn’t fixed, Israel will fall prey to another conceptzia in the future. The Oct. 7 attack took place nearly 50 years to the day after the Yom Kippur War, when Israel was almost wiped out because it stuck to another set of false assumptions. Dozens of conferences were held about that earlier conceptzia even as Israel was on the verge of suffering the disastrous impact of another one.
“This shows you that if you don’t change culturally, you’ll repeat the same mistake. And the 7th of October was much worse than what happened during the Yom Kippur War,” Avivi said.
He recommends “mapping” and monitoring cultural changes in the army to ensure the problem is fixed. “It’s all about the kind of people that you put at the head of the organization. The army must say to itself, ‘We need diversity of thought.’”
“Personnel is policy,” agreed IDSF’s Yissachar, noting that the IDF’s work environment is difficult enough with little financial reward as it is. “At least make people feel that their ideas are heard. Until now, if you draw outside the lines, the reaction is not positive.”
Israel’s top brass still don’t like their ideas to be challenged. Officers leading Oct. 7 inquiry teams who were deemed too critical weren’t allowed to present their findings, Yissachar said.
It’s not a new problem. For example, “red teams” are found in every military and intelligence organization in the world. They exist to contradict prevailing assumptions. “The CIA, Mi6 and the FBI have serious red teams,” Yissachar said. “There used to be a red team in the IDF’s Military Intelligence Directorate. It was basically one person, an IDF reservist. He was mostly ignored. Among the intelligence directorate’s upper echelon, alternative interpretations are not warmly welcomed.”
Also, officers of the General Staff asked to testify before the Knesset have ignored the summons. “Imagine if U.S. generals refused to testify before Congress,” Yissachar said. Yet, IDF chiefs of staff have a history of intervening to prevent officers from testifying.
The previous chief of staff, Lt. Gen. (res.) Herzi Halevi, had this trait in spades, Yissachar said, disliking any criticism, or just people “simply asking questions.”
If there is a silver lining, the IDF and the government now understand that Israel needs to rebuild its army, and on a large scale, especially with the possibility of Egypt and Turkey emerging as future threats, said Avivi.
But that realization doesn’t necessarily point to the cultural change Avivi and Yissachar speak about.
Spencer is more forgiving. Although the IDF admittedly suffered a “devastating failure” on Oct. 7, he gives the military high marks for its subsequent performance in Gaza, saying it has shown “adaptation, resolve and measurable results.”
Spencer cautions about comparing defensive and offensive operations when looking at the IDF’s performance vs. Iran and on Oct. 7.
“Militaries around the world are generally more comfortable preparing for offensive operations than building comprehensive national defense,” he said, noting that defense requires political consensus, prioritizing threats and ongoing investment.
“In Israel’s case, that meant prioritizing Iran and Hezbollah, and underestimating Hamas. That was not just an intelligence failure, it was a systemic vulnerability common to many democratic societies,” he said.
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