https://quadrant.org.au/magazine/from-our-archives/wiser-men-iranian-deal/
Back in December 2013, former US secretaries of state Henry Kissinger (who served from 1973 to 1977) and George Shultz (1982 to 1989) wrote an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal titled “What a Final Iran Deal Must Do”. This missive appeared a week after President Obama signed the 2013 interim nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, one that purported to temporarily freeze Tehran’s decade-long advance towards military nuclear capability. Kissinger and Shultz warned that the Islamic Republic’s quest for the nuclear bomb would be enhanced by the 2013 interim agreement. On April 12, 2015, a week after Obama celebrated his latest “breakthrough” with the Mullahs of Iran, the so-called framework for a preliminary nuclear agreement, Kissinger and Shultz published a sequel in the Wall Street Journal, this time titled “The Iran Deal and Its Consequences”. The worst fears of the former secretaries of state appeared to be confirmed by the latest turn of events:
“negotiations that began 12 years ago as an international effort to prevent an Iranian capability to develop a nuclear arsenal are ending with an agreement that concedes this very capability, albeit short of its full capacity in the first ten years.”
The problem, in the opinion of Kissinger and Shultz, is that the P5+1 (UN Security Council members plus Germany) negotiations have progressively legitimised Tehran’s thirteen-year-old quest for nuclear weapons capability. Between 2003 and 2013 Tehran “defied unambiguous UN and IAEA demands and proceeded with a major nuclear effort, incompatible with an exclusively civilian purpose”. During this time Iran “periodically engaged in talks but never dismantled any aspect of its enrichment infrastructure or growing stockpile of fissile material”, notwithstanding six Security Council resolutions passed between 2006 and 2010. The interim agreement reached on November 24, 2013, had provided the Islamic Republic with an estimated $8 billion in sanctions relief in exchange for a temporary halt to some aspects of its nuclear program. Tehran was not being asked to dismantle or wind back its vast nuclear infrastructure, let alone lengthen the breakout time necessary to acquire nuclear weapons capability. Thus, the 2013 interim agreement effectively “recognised as baseline” past Iranian misconduct including uranium enrichment and plutonium production, all previously condemned by the United States and the international community as illegal and illegitimate.