The Three Big Ideas Behind the Abraham Accords They can lead to peace in the Middle East, but only if the U.S. stops moralizing and takes Iranian threats seriously. By Ed Husain
‘You can always trust the Americans to do the right thing—after they’ve tried everything else,” Winston Churchill is said to have quipped. This week marks the third anniversary of one such “right thing”: the Abraham Accords. Announced on Aug. 13, 2020, and ratified the following month, the agreements heralded a new beginning of peace in the Middle East as several Arab nations agreed to normalize relations with Israel. The previous five American presidents tried “everything else” with Palestinian leaders and failed. The Abraham Accords broke that streak.
The agreements are premised on three big ideas. The first is that a collective security arrangement among Arab countries, Israel and the U.S. should be implemented to protect ordinary citizens from Islamist extremism. Egypt, Jordan and Turkey had long been warm to the idea, but other Muslim countries resisted, fearful of triggering radical uprisings. Egypt’s Anwar Sadat was assassinated two years after signing peace with Israel at Camp David.
Yet with mounting regional threats and a new generation of Arab leaders, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan—with the quiet support of other Arab nations—agreed to a different security architecture and vision for the Middle East: namely, promoting religious co-existence and integrating Jews into the region. These decisions quickly provoked the ire of the Iranian government, which continued to wage its campaign of aggression by supporting such groups as Hamas and Hezbollah, seizing oil tankers, shooting at vessels in international waters, and threatening any leader who engages with Israel.
It is no accident that the Iran-backed Yemeni Houthis chant as their slogan “Death to America. Death to Israel.” Still, many U.S. regional allies often see America as harsh and moralistic toward friends yet respectful toward adversaries. The Abraham Accords present an opportunity to reset that dynamic.
The second idea underlying the accords is that a wave of prosperity would follow from regional economic cooperation. Israel is home to a blossoming Silicon Valley. The Tel Aviv neighborhood of Sarona is buzzing with billions of American dollars chasing the latest innovations in technology and artificial intelligence. And a new generation of Arabs want to savor the fruits of Israel’s commercial prosperity.
Take Saudi Arabia, around 60% of whose people are under 30. To uplift its country, Riyadh is attempting to build Neom and al-Ula—a smart mega city and cultural-heritage project, respectively—that are only a short flight from Tel Aviv. The Middle East is home to sovereign wealth funds worth some $4 trillion. Saudi Arabia and Israel are engaged in peace talks for a simple reason: They want to elevate their citizens’ quality of life.
That requires a strong government backed by reliable military capabilities. Those aspirations weren’t realized by the 2011 Arab Spring, when uprisings led to chaos, the rise of ISIS and attacks on the American homeland. The U.S. is positioned to offer the necessary strength for stability, yet it risks undermining this delicate regional balance by seeking to impose its political values on other nations. It should instead focus on being a model democracy at home.
The third idea is a recognition that the Middle East is home to new power centers. For much of the last century, Cairo, Baghdad and Damascus were loci of nationalist-socialist revolutions. As each city pursued Soviet-style economic policies, it collapsed and left a void for religious extremism to fill.
Royal sheikhs in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh now set the current regional order and market-based competitive tone. Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt understood the royalty’s significance and included them—particularly King Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia—in important geopolitical meetings. Arab sheikhs kept out Russian communism then, in large part by rewarding influential anticommunist Muslims with scholarships, privileged access to Islamic holy sites and job-market access. They can do the same as the West confronts Chinese communism today.
In failing to support Gulf countries in the face of Iranian aggression, we have left several regional allies in the lurch. Beijing is now making deals with oil-rich countries to widen its net and suggest that the U.S. isn’t dependable. Gulf countries, disappointed with America’s response to Tehran’s bullying, have appreciated Beijing’s advances. Rather than reprimand these countries for doing so, America must change its policies to accommodate their security needs. If they are to be successful, the Abraham Accords must lead to greater safety and prosperity for its signatories.
It isn’t too late. China is surrounded by such Muslim neighbors as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia, over which Arab sheikhs hold influence. Where America isn’t as credible—say, in Islamabad—sheikhs maintain support at the military, popular and government level.
But that will work to our advantage only if we’re actually responsive to such countries’ needs. Other nations will join the American-led regional order and make peace with Israel when they see the U.S. extend reliable military support to its allies. This crescendo effect awaits America if we deliver on the promise of the Abraham Accords.
Mr. Husain is director of the N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Atlantic Council and Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation, and a professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.
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