The U.S. Needs More Nuclear Weapons As Russia and China build up their stockpiles, Washington is replacing weapons one-for-one. By Matthew R. Costlow
This year marks the 100th anniversary of the conclusion of the Washington Naval Conference, which brought together the great naval powers of the day—the U.S., U.K., Japan, France and Italy—for arms-limitation talks. Leaders hoped that limiting the weapons of war would reduce the risk of a second global conflagration. In one of the dark ironies of history, the naval arms-control treaties of the 1920s, which were supposed to bring peace, prohibited or limited the production of allied ships that were needed most to protect U.S. territories and eventually halt Japanese expansion in World War II.
Much like the allied countries that took a break from naval modernization during the interwar years, so too have the nuclear powers largely reduced their stockpiles during the current post-Cold War procurement “holiday.”
Since the early 1990s, the U.S. Defense Department spent only about 2% of its annual budget on sustaining and extending the life of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In 1987 the U.S. had about 23,000 nuclear weapons in its stockpile. The U.S. has fewer than 4,000 today. World-wide, nuclear stockpiles haven’t been this small since the late 1950s.
China and Russia have embarked on rapid nuclear buildups, and the U.S. and U.K. are only now recognizing the danger. The Pentagon projects China will quadruple its nuclear arsenal to 1,000 weapons by 2030. U.S. officials dare not speculate publicly whether Beijing will stop there. Russia’s nuclear arsenal, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency, will “grow significantly” over this decade, driven by the expansion of nonstrategic nuclear weapons with a “warfighting role.”
In contrast, Washington and London are planning to replace their nuclear delivery systems essentially on a one-for-one basis over the next two decades. America’s adversaries jointly have reversed the multidecade world-wide trend toward nuclear disarmament—yet the U.S. nuclear plans remain unchanged. As Washington debates whether to replace 50-year-old intercontinental ballistic missiles, Moscow and Beijing are expanding their nuclear arsenals at a rate not seen since the Cold War.
The Biden administration is expected to release next month the findings of its Nuclear Posture Review, a report that will shape the U.S. nuclear posture for decades. New ICBMs are expected to operate into the 2070s and new submarines into the 2080s. Decisions made today will have an effect on nearly four generations.
The administration is under intense pressure from the Democratic Party’s far left wing to deliver “progress” through cuts to the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Instead, the Biden administration should consider expanding the stockpile and altering its approach to deterrence more broadly.
The U.S. should heighten its naval advantages by purchasing additional nuclear-armed submarines, continuing to pursue a sea-based nuclear cruise missile, and replacing the four soon-to-be-retired guided-missile submarines. To strengthen the credibility of its nuclear deterrence, the U.S. should pursue a missile-defense system to protect against limited Chinese and Russian strikes on American soil, especially those designed to cripple the American power-projection capabilities necessary to defend allies. Changes to the U.S. stockpile size will be for naught if Beijing and Moscow believe they easily can shock Washington into submission with homeland strikes.
Mr. Biden helped usher through many nuclear arms-control treaties during his time in the Senate. It may cut against his political instincts, but the president’s duty now is to chart a path for U.S. nuclear expansion, and build the weapons—offensive and defensive—necessary to deter China and Russia before it is too late.
Mr. Costlow is a senior analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy.
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