How Adversaries Size Up Biden’s Foreign Policy He slaps vanity sanctions on would-be friends, playing into China’s hands. Walter Russell Mead
Last week Russian troops fanned out across Kazakhstan; the Myanmar junta sentenced Aung San Suu Kyi to four more years in prison; and China transferred a senior official from Xinjiang to lead the People’s Liberation Army’s garrison in Hong Kong. Two things are clear. First, America’s geopolitical adversaries aren’t impressed by the Biden administration. Second, the administration’s attempts to make a priority of human rights and democracy have so far failed to reverse or even to slow the retreat of democracy around the world.
The Biden administration’s political fragility at home is partly to blame. But adversaries are watching more than American domestic politics; they see incoherence in American policy. The administration has signaled that balancing China in the Indo-Pacific, the promotion of democracy and climate policy are its overriding foreign-policy priorities. Our adversaries—and some of our friends—think that these goals can’t be pursued successfully at the same time. They conclude that American policy focused on incompatible objectives will ultimately fail.
Take Asia. There is no way to counter China’s regional ambitions without solidifying the American position in Southeast Asia. Yet here President Biden’s prime geopolitical goal of balancing China runs counter to his goal of democracy promotion. So far, there aren’t many signs that the administration is handling this tension effectively.
Case in point: As work on what looks like an important Chinese naval base in Cambodia continues, the U.S. is busy slapping sanctions on Cambodia’s armed forces and politicians. American sanctions of this type typically irritate their targets without producing the desired changes in behavior. Cambodian Premier Hun Sen seems unmoved by American sanctions and lectures. He is using his country’s one-year presidency of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or Asean, to undercut America’s policy of isolating the junta in Myanmar.
Vanity sanctions have long been a go-to for politicians looking to gain cheap popularity at home and to pacify democracy warriors and their media allies on the left and right. During the so-called posthistorical period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the U.S. had no powerful rivals, indulging in vanity sanctions seemed to carry no price. Republican and Democratic administrations alike merrily imposed them at will. In today’s world, gratuitously offending needed partners is dangerous, but the democracy caucus in the Biden administration hasn’t gotten the memo.
It isn’t just sanctions. Last month’s virtual Summit for Democracy had an odd guest list. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Pakistan were invited; seven of the 10 members of Asean were not. At a time when America needs to tighten relations with Asean countries, the U.S. held a summit that excluded not only Myanmar but also Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The pointlessness of the summit presumably reduced the sting of exclusion. But especially as domestic protectionism hamstrings serious American trade diplomacy, the U.S. needs to find ways to attract Asean leaders, not drive them into China’s waiting embrace.
This problem isn’t limited to small countries. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party in India contains many elements that are, to say the least, problematic from a democracy and human-rights perspective. There are widespread reports of violence and harassment against Christians, especially converts, in parts of India under BJP control. Elements in the governing coalition believe that India’s future as a Hindu state depends on marginalizing its Muslim minority. Few Americans will sympathize with these perspectives, but it isn’t easy to know how to respond. A balancing coalition that can check Chinese ambitions without India is hard to imagine. Without both India and a large number of nondemocratic regimes in Southeast Asia, it is impossible.
America’s habit of slapping vanity sanctions on countries whose policies we don’t like leads many countries, including allies, to cultivate defense ties with Russia and China as a hedge against American disapproval. Russia and China would like nothing more than to muscle into the lucrative Gulf arms market. Preserving and even deepening military ties with Russia, including the purchase of the S-400 air defense system, strikes many Indians as prudent given American unpredictability. India’s decision to cooperate with China against the effort to incorporate strong anticoal language in the COP26 agreement suggests that the Biden climate agenda can also provide leverage for our opponents.
Mr. Biden is right that democracy promotion, climate change and geopolitical competition all matter. But after a year in office, his administration hasn’t convinced the world that it has a sustainable plan to pursue these ambitious goals.
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