RUTHFULLY YOURS

These decisions reasoned that the immaturity of juvenile defendants made such sentences impermissibly disproportionate. Dissenters argued that the Eighth Amendment was written simply to forbid cruel methods of punishment, not to impose a judicially created sentencing proportionality regimen. The dissenters also cited numerous state sentencing laws permitting life without parole for juveniles to show that such sentences weren’t unusual.

Whether one agrees with the majority or the dissenters in those cases—a question on which the authors of this article take different views—a case the high court is now considering for review could unite those positions. In Chandler v. Mississippi, the sentencing judge imposed life without parole after pronouncing the defendant “mature” and noting that 17-year-olds—the age at which Joey Chandler committed the murder in question—may engage in numerous adult activities, from driving to obtaining an abortion. The judge also recounted the story of a 17-year-old who received a Medal of Honor during World War II, adding that he couldn’t have been called “immature.” As a final fillip, in recognition of the Supreme Court’s “talk” about prospects for rehabilitation, the judge pointed out that the executive is empowered to commute sentences.

What the judge did not do before imposing life without parole was consider whether he could find that the defendant was irretrievably depraved. Yet the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the sentence over a strong dissent.

The circumstances of Mr. Chandler’s crime include the social pathology that often surrounds such cases. He shot his 19-year-old cousin in 2003 for stealing marijuana Mr. Chandler intended to sell to support his pregnant girlfriend. As also happens occasionally in such cases, while in prison Mr. Chandler appears to have turned around his life, or what there is of it. He earned a high-school diploma, trained extensively in two trades, married and maintained an unblemished disciplinary record. Lawyers and advocates routinely present that sort of evidence to parole boards in aid of release, often successfully.

The mitigating factors in Mr. Chandler’s postconviction history, and the undeniable fact of his youth at the time he murdered his cousin, are presented in the friend-of-the-court brief that 45 current and former prosecutors and judges, including us, recently filed urging the U.S. Supreme Court to hear this case. Those mitigating factors may be of less concern to the court in determining whether to hear this case than the requirement that the court’s own rulings be adhered to—also presented in our brief—and perhaps the chance to articulate standards for applying them.

Some might argue that these achievements were simply part of a strategy to undo his sentence, or that being a model prisoner provides no assurance that Chandler would be a model citizen, or that denying another person the right to live in an act of revenge over a trivial matter, and denying to his family members their right to his presence, demands that Mr. Chandler never even have the opportunity to seek parole. But the Supreme Court has required that most juveniles be given that opportunity.

The high court doesn’t sit simply to correct mistakes, even egregious ones. A case generally must present a question beyond whether it was rightly or wrongly decided to merit the justices’ attention. This case would provide an opportunity for the court to make clear that a finding of “such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is impossible,” based on factors meaningfully considered by the sentencing court, is a prerequisite to imposing life without parole for murder convicted by a juvenile. The circumstances of the crime itself—whether it involved wanton cruelty—and the defendant’s criminal history, are obvious matters that a sentencing court should take into account. The justices could suggest others.

One thing is certain: That 17-year-olds may drive cars or get abortions, or that a 17-year-old was decorated for battlefield heroism, that the executive can grant clemency—all these things are irrelevant to whether Joey Chandler exhibited “such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is impossible.”

Mr. Mukasey served as U.S. attorney general (2007-09) and a U.S. district judge (1988-2006). Ms. McCord is a visiting professor of law and senior litigator at Georgetown University Law Center’s Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection, where she co-authored a friend-of-the-court brief in Chandler v. Mississippi. She has served as acting assistant attorney general for national security and a federal prosecutor.