RUTHFULLY YOURS

PETER HUESSY- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE-SECOND TO ONE

Posted By Ruth King on January 24th, 2014

http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/detail/nuclear-deterrence-second-to-one?f=puball

On November 8^th, 2013, at Kings Bay Naval Base in Georgia, Professor Mathew Kroenig of Georgetown University, explained that “there is no reason to believe that the U.S. nuclear arsenal somehow causes proliferation in other countries.” This is a startling statement because the assumption in much of the nuclear deterrent commentary is that US nuclear force levels have an important bearing on the decision by other nations-such as Iran, China, Pakistan and North Korea, for example– to pursue nuclear weapons or expand the arsenals they have.

As the professor explained: “Nuclear force sizing decisions therefore should be made on other criteria: deterrence, assurance, cost, other things, not on proliferation ”

He further emphasized,  “And when you take all those things into account, as I’ve argued in an article in the current issue of Foreign Policy Magazine, I think when you add these things up, the conclusion I come to is the United States shouldn’t make any additional nuclear reductions and we should strive to maintain nuclear superiority over any potential rival.”

This critically important assessment follows here.

MR. MATTHEW KROENIG:  Good morning.  It’s a pleasure to be here today.  As Ambassador Brooks said, I’m a professor at Georgetown, not a student.  When I introduce myself from Georgetown, people sometimes assume I’m a student, but I’m a tenured professor, actually since August.

(Laughter).

I was asked today to speak today about the relationship between U.S. nuclear force posture and nonproliferation, and our nonproliferation goals.  And to do that, I’m going to start with a story.  In 2007 I was finishing up my Ph.D. dissertation at the University of California at Berkley.  I was working on nuclear non-proliferation, and particularly on how sensitive nuclear technology transfers influence proliferation.  It ended up becoming my first book, “Exporting the Bomb.”

But the standards for good academic research and for getting tenure-track professorships are increasingly stringent, so I was spending a lot of time in the archives working on my case studies,  a lot of time reading the literature, making sure my argument was original and sound, a lot of time building data sets and doing quantitative analysis.  And I wasn’t really following the policy debates that closely, actually.

Then in 2008 I moved to Washington, D.C. to begin as a professor at Georgetown, and I heard many people making these claims that U.S. nuclear weapons – the U.S. nuclear arsenal causes proliferation and therefore we need to cut the size of our arsenal to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.  At first I didn’t think much of this, and then after a while I thought maybe it was just political posturing.  And then finally I realized that there were a lot of people who actually believe this.

This came as something of a shock to me because there’s a huge academic literature on nonproliferation, nuclear proliferation, the factors that we think cause countries to build nuclear weapons, a ton of case studies, a ton of quantitative evidence.  Social scientists think they know something about this question.  I thought I knew something about this question.

But there’s not a single peer-reviewed study that suggests that the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal causes proliferation or that cuts to the size of the arsenal will somehow stop proliferation.  So I repeat that, there’s not a single peer-reviewed study that suggests that there’s a relationship between the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and proliferation.  Now this is different from think tank reports or NGO reports.  Any organization with a printer can produce those.

But peer-reviewed research meets a different standard.  It means it’s anonymously sent to other experts who decide whether the research is above the bar or not.  And again, not a single peer-reviewed study suggests that the size of the U.S. arsenal causes proliferation.

So for the rest of my time I’d like to do three things.  First, present this argument as to why some people – flesh out the argument that some people believe is true–that the U.S. posture somehow causes proliferation.  Second, make an argument as to why that’s almost certainly not the case.  And then third, offer some concluding remarks.

So first, many people do claim that there’s some kind of link between our arsenal size and proliferation, including our president.  In the Nuclear Posture Review of 2010, upon its release, the president said, quote, “To stop the spread of nuclear weapons we will work aggressively to advance every element of our comprehensive agenda to reduce arsenals, to secure vulnerable nuclear materials and to strengthen the NPT.”  So to stop the spread of nuclear weapons we’ll do a number of things, including reduce arsenals.

In his Prague speech in 2009 President Obama argued, quote, “The basic bargain is sound.  Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament.  Countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them,” end quote.

So those are the statements from the president, but there are many policy experts, politicians, and policy makers who make the claim that there is a link.  And they make a number of arguments.  One argument they make is that it’s difficult if not hypocritical for the United States, with a large nuclear arsenal, to go to countries like Iran or North Korea and tell them that they can’t have nuclear weapons.  That it complicates our ability to dissuade proliferation in that way.  But, if we cut our arsenal, that would create the goodwill that would allow us to bring additional pressure to bear.

Now sometimes they argue that the determined proliferators like Iran or North Korea are hard to stop, and so cuts won’t influence then directly, but it will influence our ability to get cooperation on nonproliferation issues.  To put pressure on Iran, to put pressure on North Korea, we need to get international cooperation.  We need to get countries in the nonaligned movement on our side.  We need to get countries like Turkey and Brazil to put pressure on Iran.

And again, by reducing the size of our arsenal we can create the goodwill that will allow us to do that.  It’s difficult, if not hypocritical, for us to go to them and say we have a large arsenal but you don’t have nuclear weapons.  Iran doesn’t have nuclear weapons, but we need your help to stop Iran from building nuclear weapons.

Another argument they make is that if the United States, the largest superpower on Earth needs nuclear weapons for its security, then that sends a message to other weaker powers that they also need nuclear weapons for their security.

And a third and final argument they make is that we have a legal obligation under the NPT to disarm.  According to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, they argue, there’s this basic bargain where nuclear weapons states disarm in exchange for non-nuclear weapons states not pursuing nuclear weapons.

So at a superficial level, these arguments make sense.  But when you start to scratch the surface you realize there’s actually nothing there.  So let’s first look at the example of a country like Iran, and ask whether the U.S. nuclear arsenal influences Iran’s proliferation decisions.

So I thought a lot about Iran’s nuclear program.  I worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the Iran desk a couple of years ago as an adviser.  And I just finished a book on Iran’s nuclear program that will be out in the spring.

So as the Supreme Leader thinks about whether to continue with this program or to give it up, he’s thinking about a lot of things.  He’s thinking about whether they have the technical capability to produce nuclear weapons, thinking about whether they’ll be able to continue to get materials on the international market – the materials they’re still not able to produce for themselves for their nuclear program – thinking about how nuclear weapons will contribute to their security goals of being able to deter foreign attack, being able to become the most dominant state in the region.  They’re thinking about whether they can withstand sanctions from the international community, thinking about whether they can withstand possible military strikes from the United States or Israel.

So there’s a lot that the Supreme Leader is thinking about.  But in weighing all these factors, it’s really implausible to think that if the United States cut from 1,500 to 1,000 weapons, that suddenly the Supreme Leader would give up his program.   That’s just not an important factor bearing on his decision.

So again, the slightly more sophisticated argument is, you can’t convince Iran or North Korea, but you can convince the other countries whose help we need to put pressure on Iran or North Korea.  And one country that is sometimes mentioned is Turkey.  So let’s look at Turkey’s decision-making and how Turkey is thinking about non-proliferation and Iran.

So I was in Istanbul I guess about a year ago now talking to Turkish officials, Turkish academics, and Turkish journalists, about their views on Iran’s nuclear program.  So again, Turkey’s government is thinking about a lot of things.  It’s thinking about the threat posed by a nuclear armed Iran.  It’s thinking about how putting more pressure on Iran and cutting more trade and investment with Iran is going to hurt Turkey’s economy.  It’s thinking about its relations, bilateral relations, with Iran.

After all, Iran is right next door and it’s going to have to live with Iran whether it gets nuclear weapons or not.  So it would like to maintain good relations with Iran.  But it would also like to maintain good relations with the United States and the international community, so it’s thinking about how its choices vis-à-vis Iran are going to affect those relations.

And it’s thinking about whether the help of additional Turkish pressure is really going to make a difference or not.  Can Turkey just free ride on the U.S. and international efforts?  Does their policy really matter?

So again, the Turkish government is thinking about a lot of things when it’s thinks about whether to put additional pressure on Iran.  The size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is not one of them.  And it kind of strains credibility to make an argument as to how that would be an important factor.  And again, if the United States cut from 1,550 to 1,000, it wouldn’t have any effect on Turkish decision-making.

So that’s kind of the logic of it.  But I also, for better or worse, political scientists now are trying to be more like economists, doing game theory and statistical analyses.  So I have this academic paper that I’m working on, that I’m happy to share if people are interested, where I looked for systematic correlations between the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and measurable nonproliferation decisions from 1945 to the present.

So I’m looking at other country’s decisions to explore, pursue and acquire nuclear weapons, looking at other country’s decisions to export sensitive nuclear technology, looking at the way countries vote on nonproliferation issues at international bodies like the UN Security Council.  And I couldn’t find any evidence of a correlation between the size of the U.S. arsenal and other country’s proliferation decisions.

Now there is some reason to believe that the U.S. arsenal discourages proliferation to our allies.  And I think everyone in the room understands the important role of nuclear weapons in assurance.  And there are academic studies that suggest that U.S. nuclear security guarantees prevent nuclear proliferation.  So, there are peer-reviewed academic studies that show that the opposite relationship is true, that the U.S. nuclear arsenal prevents proliferation to our allies.

And there are reasons to believe that, you know, while many people want to cut our arsenal, actually our requirements might increase in coming years.  So there are some people who have argued that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons we’d be forced to extend a nuclear umbrella to – or we might decide to extend a nuclear umbrella to Israel, to Gulf states, to other states in the region to protect them from the Iranian nuclear threat.  It wouldn’t take a genius to understand that if we have a smaller umbrella that we’re trying to extend to more and more people, that somebody is going to get wet.

So what about the NPT argument, we have a legal obligation to disarm?  Well Article VI of the NPT says that all states, not just nuclear weapons states, all states, have a requirement to, quote, “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” So there is no requirement to disarm, no requirement to cut, simply a requirement to, quote, “Pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to… disarmament.”

So the United States should comply with its Article VI commitments.  I think the nuclear nonproliferation treaty has been incredibly successful.  But complying with Article VI means pursuing negotiations in good faith.  It doesn’t mean actually making any nuclear reductions.  And I think given the current security environment, some of the things that our other colleagues have talked about, there are reasons to believe that that reductions would be a mistake at this point.

So in short, in conclusion, there is no reason to believe that the U.S. nuclear arsenal somehow causes proliferation in other countries.  Nuclear force sizing decisions therefore should be made on other criteria: deterrence, assurance, cost, other things, not on proliferation .  And when you take all those things into account, as I’ve argued elsewhere, as I’ve argued in an article in the current issue of Foreign Policy Magazine, I think when you add these things up, the conclusion I come to is the United States shouldn’t make any additional nuclear reductions and we should strive to maintain nuclear superiority over any potential rival.

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