https://tomklingenstein.com/hegseths-reforms-are-what-the-army-needs/
On May 1, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth executed what may be remembered as the most significant act of institutional reform in the American military since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. In a single memo, Hegseth initiated a reorganization of the Army that consolidates command structures, dismantles legacy programs, eliminates bureaucratic dead weight, and restores merit-based advancement. More importantly, it repudiates the reigning progressive orthodoxy that has turned the Pentagon into a symbol of regime decadence rather than national defense.
This reformation, co-led by Army Secretary Dan Driscoll and Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George, reflects not only a strategic shift in military doctrine but a philosophical realignment away from managerial liberalism toward a more classical understanding of executive leadership. It is the kind of executive decisiveness that critics of the administrative state, from James Burnham to Angelo Codevilla, have long argued is necessary to break the inertia of our postmodern bureaucracies. This was not reform by committee. It was an assertion of will.
From Bureaucracy to Battlefield
The Army that Hegseth inherited was shaped by the long war on terror — an era of dispersed, low-intensity conflict that encouraged bureaucratic sprawl and doctrinal stagnation. In 2001, there were 871 generals and admirals serving throughout the Armed Forces. Today, there are roughly 950 — nearly a 10% growth, even though the total force has shrunk by roughly the same percentage over the same period. As War on the Rocks noted in a 2022 piece, this top-heavy structure created a glut of careerists more concerned with promotion boards than combat readiness.
The May 1 directive cuts approximately 40 general officer billets and up to 1,000 civilian staff roles at the Pentagon. In their place, Hegseth has emphasized agile command-and-control, streamlined formations, and the integration of unmanned systems. The retirement of legacy equipment like the Humvee and outdated rotary-wing platforms reflects a sober recognition that great power competition — not counterinsurgency — is now the defining strategic reality.
This modernization is long overdue. A 2021 RAND study found that the U.S. military’s acquisition system “incentivizes risk aversion and conformity,” resulting in a procurement timeline that often stretches over decades. The pivot toward off-the-shelf, commercially adaptable unmanned platforms represents not only a technological update, but a repudiation of the failed industrial-consultant complex that has long dominated defense acquisition.