or his part, Trump has been ambiguous, perhaps strategically so, on how he intends to handle the Iran deal, variously suggesting that he would tear it up, restructure it, or — in a significant departure from the Obama administration — hold the mullahs to its strict letter.
I would propose a different tack: Trump should treat the Iran deal the way it should have been treated all along — as a treaty.
Doing so would help President Trump accomplish two critical objectives in one fell swoop. First, without necessarily dismantling any benefits Obama may have secured, Trump would lawfully transfer to himself the power to renegotiate the deal on better terms — the signature skill on which he built his successful White House bid. Second, he would reverse a perilous constitutional setback that purports to create American legal obligations through international proceedings in which powers hostile to the United States — Russia, China, and Iran itself — weigh in, but the American people’s elected representatives are frozen out.
It cannot be stressed enough that the Iran deal is not law, at least for the most part (more on that caveat momentarily). An international agreement becomes legally binding on the American people only if it is ratified as a treaty or enabled by ordinary legislation. Neither is true of the JCPOA. It is therefore a mere executive agreement that may be canceled at any time. The fact that Obama signed it and got it endorsed by the United Nations Security Council is insufficient, under our Constitution, to create legal obligations. Indeed, that is why there is rampant speculation about what Trump might do — had the agreement been ratified or statutorily enacted, there would be nothing to discuss.
There is a complication (isn’t there always?). When the Obama administration signed the JCPOA, Congress did not do what it should have done — namely, either (a) nothing at all or (b) pass a “sense of the Senate” or “sense of Congress” resolution affirming that, for an international agreement to be legally binding, the Constitution requires the president to present it to the Senate for approval or seek legislation implementing its terms. Instead, Congress foolishly enacted legislation — the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) — which allowed the president to claim a legislative imprimatur with only one-third support from Congress.
I will not rehash the demerits of INARA — I have already done that repeatedly and at length (see here and follow the links). It is not my intention here to provoke more debate with Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Bob Corker, who says he is a staunch opponent of the Iran deal. I am proposing a way for Senator Corker to lead a meaningful opposition.
INARA is relevant for present purposes because, as I have previously explained, it arguably repealed sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program. Although the language is less than clear, I believe the courts would see it that way.