https://amgreatness.com/2025/02/24/trumps-ukrainian-tightrope/
To find an impossible peace between Ukraine and Russia we must understand the recent history of the war and the European and American roles in it. So, Americans should revisit some fundamental realities and questions from which to remember before going forward:
Why Did Putin Invade Ukraine in 2022?
Putin did start the war. Trump’s trolling aside, he knows that because he correctly pointed out that Putin invaded his neighbors in three of the last four administrations—but not his own, given Trump’s deterrence.
The most obvious answer why Putin did is that he thought he easily could. But why in 2022—as he had in 2008 and 2014?
Putin has nonending opportunistic desires to recombobulate what he thinks properly is and will always be Russian—whether territories to be formally absorbed or as coerced satellite states. But he moves on them only whenever he thinks the benefits outweigh the costs.
And by February 2022, he certainly felt they did.
The U.S. and NATO had lost all appearances of deterrence vis-à-vis Russia. Joe Biden had been part of the Obama-Biden administration that had naively appeased Putin for some eight years. Remember their 2009 reset by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that was based on numerous flawed and disastrous assumptions:
The prior Bush sanctions against Putin for invading Georgia and grabbing parts of South Ossetia were overly harsh, reflective of his supposed cowboyism evident in Iraq.
The Obama mystique, coupled with criticism of the prior Bush administration, would win over Putin. Remember Obama’s 2012 hot mic appeasement in Seoul, when Obama promised Putin “flexibility” (i.e., cancellation of Eastern European defense, if Putin gave Obama “space” for his “last election” (i.e., please don’t invade and embarrass Obama until after he was reelected in 2012).
The U.S. thought it could act unilaterally in Libya and Syria, talk of expanding NATO in Europe, and expect a humiliated Russia to keep silent and distant.
Once rebuffed by Putin, who took Obama’s measure, an angry and rejected U.S. would cajole, beg, and finally try to force European Union democratic values onto the Putin regime—by sanctions, by aiding Russian dissident groups, and by claiming Putin was America’s archenemy.
The flawed working theory was that an either compliant or defiant Putin could acquiesce and begin liberalizing Russia, in emulation of EU and US democracy.