PETER JENNINGS – The Diplomatic Folly of Recognising Palestine
https://quadrant.org.au/magazine/foreign-affairs/the-diplomatic-folly-of-recognising-palestine/
Anthony Albanese has taken one of the most consequential—and reckless—foreign policy steps of his prime ministership: announcing the decision to recognise Palestine as a state at the UN in September. The move will not bring peace, will not free a single hostage, and will almost certainly reward Hamas for its October 2023 atrocities.
The announcement was made in a chilly Parliament House courtyard on August 11. A prime ministerial media statement said that seventy-seven years ago Australia had supported UN Resolution 181 to create the State of Israel and a Palestinian state. Now, “the world can no longer wait for the implementation of that Resolution to be negotiated between the parties”.
Albanese was emboldened to bring forward recognition now on the basis of: “major new commitments from the Palestinian Authority, including to reform governance, terminate prisoner payments, institute schooling reform, demilitarise and hold general elections. The Palestinian Authority has also restated its recognition of Israel’s right to exist. The President of the Palestinian Authority has reaffirmed these commitments directly to the Australian Government.”
The Prime Minister said that “Australia’s position is predicated on the commitments we have received from the Palestinian Authority”, but the government is taking it on faith that the PA can and will take these steps. Recognition will happen in September at the UN in New York. Whatever the PA does, or fails to do, to implement these rather vague commitments, will happen after that time.
Australia’s move had been some months in the making. In a departure from her normally bloodless delivery Foreign Minister Penny Wong told ABC Radio that “the reason for urgency behind recognition is this, there is a risk that there will be no Palestine left to recognise if the world does not act”. The statement is utter nonsense but shows that the government has a head of steam up on the issue and won’t be deterred by inconvenient facts.
The Australian announcement was part of a co-ordinated effort involving a core group of countries, the UK, Canada and France, joined on occasion by other European nations, Japan and New Zealand. Four “joint statements” since June have been released, making the case that the war in Gaza must be ended “through an immediate and permanent ceasefire” and maintaining that “a negotiated two-state solution [is] the only way to guarantee that both Israelis and Palestinians can live side by side in peace, security, and dignity”.
Anthony Albanese has not yet managed to meet US President Donald Trump face to face, but he was able to put a call through to Mahmoud Abbas, the eighty-nine-year-old President of the Palestinian Authority, to discuss Gaza and a two-state solution. Albanese said: “It was a very constructive discussion … We agreed that we would meet in September in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.” Albanese also spoke with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and acknowledged that Netanyahu had opposed his proposal to recognise Palestine. That’s hardly surprising given that Australia has subjected Israel to relentless political haranguing since the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023.
Wong and Albanese are careful to put the case that there should be no role for Hamas in a Palestinian state and that the terrorist group should disarm and hand over the Israeli hostages. But our leaders quickly resort to the defence that there is little we can do to shape practical outcomes. Albanese told the ABC’s Laura Tingle in July: “Australia isn’t a central player in the Middle East, but what we can do is continue to do what we have done, which is to take a principled position.”
My contention here is that Australia’s “principled” position to provide recognition to a Palestinian state is an ill-considered policy, driven by domestic political considerations. Moreover, recognition that comes too early and without regard to the realities of the situation in Gaza and the West Bank has the potential to do serious damage. The ultimate winner from this Australian move will be Hamas.
There has long been bipartisan political support in Australia for a “two-state solution” to the Palestinian problem—essentially the idea that Israel and a Palestinian state can peacefully co-exist within agreed boundaries in territory that today encompasses Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. The Australian government now calls the latter area the “Occupied Palestinian Territories”. The aspiration for two states has been internationally aired for decades, but since the failure of the Oslo accords in the 1990s, there has been no practical movement towards that objective.
A “Joint Statement from Foreign Ministers of Australia, Germany, Italy, New Zealand and the United Kingdom” on August 9 expresses this goal but also makes clear the impediments to achieving it: “A political resolution based on a negotiated two-state solution requires the total demilitarisation of Hamas and its complete exclusion from any form of governance in the Gaza Strip, where the Palestinian Authority must have a central role.” Let’s be clear: there is no current negotiation between Israel and any Palestinian parties towards a two-state solution, Hamas is not demilitarising, and after almost two years of bitter fighting, it shows no sign of wanting to be excluded from governing Gaza. Moreover, the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah has played no role in Gaza since Hamas brutally expelled its officials from Gaza in 2007.
On this basis, one might think the Australian government should conclude there is no realistic prospect of implementing a two-state solution this year, and little likelihood of doing so in the coming years. The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States says that to be regarded as a state in international law, a country “should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states”. None of those qualifications easily applies to Gaza or the West Bank in 2025.
Notwithstanding these impediments, Penny Wong has quietly shifted Australian policy to claim that Palestinian statehood could be acknowledged before the war ends. She told a media conference in May 2024: “What we would say, and what I do say, is Australia no longer believes that recognition can only come at the end of a peace process. It could occur as part of a peace process.”
In August this year, the Home Affairs minister, Tony Burke, went so far as to say that even the continuing presence of Hamas in Gaza would not impede recognising Palestinian statehood. Burke told Sky News on August 10 that “There have frequently been countries where part of that nation has been occupied by a terrorist group, and we haven’t ceased to recognise the country. Both Syria and Iraq had long periods where parts of those countries were being occupied and, realistically, controlled by ISIS. It didn’t stop us from having recognition and diplomatic relations with those countries.”
Burke forgets that Iraq and Syria were vigorously fighting against ISIS at the time and that an international coalition of which Australia was an active member was doing the same. ISIS briefly controlled territory, but its claimed caliphate was not recognised as a state entity. A more accurate parallel with Gaza would be if Australia were currently supporting Israel in its efforts to destroy Hamas. We are clearly not doing that. In fact, the Albanese government’s relentless calls for ceasefires principally benefit Hamas, as a pause in military operations would keep Hamas in power in Gaza and allow their military reconstitution.
Now it seems that, regardless of the situation in Gaza, the government is locked into a process to recognise Palestine. In my judgment, there is simply no good case for Australia to join with other Western democracies to endorse recognition of a Palestinian state at the United Nations in September. This is bad policy from the perspective of the Palestinian people, Israel, and for a range of reasons relevant to Australia’s international interests. Here are the reasons Albanese should pause in this diplomatic folly.
No consensus for a two-state solution
It is self-defeating for the international community to wish a “solution” upon Palestinians and Israelis that is substantially opposed by a majority on the ground. After the Hamas pogrom of October 2023, support in Israel for a two-state solution fell significantly. The Pew Research Center reported poll results in June 2025 that show only 21 per cent of Israelis believe a “way can be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully”. Conducting opinion polling in Gaza and the West Bank is difficult, but a May 2025 report by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research found 64 per cent of Palestinians opposed a two-state solution.
The same poll found that 50 per cent of respondents still thought the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, was the “correct” decision and 87 per cent said that Hamas did not commit the atrocities “shown by international media”. Some 85 per cent of respondents in the West Bank and 64 per cent in the Gaza Strip were opposed to Hamas disarming after achieving a halt to the conflict.
Public opinion can change, but clearly it would take years and a very different state of relations between Israelis and Palestinians to develop positive attitudes towards a two-state solution. Much as we might wish for a different reality, it seems clear that many Gazans continue to support Hamas even after months of fighting.
The danger is that creating a Palestinian state will hand a more effective mechanism to Hamas and other terror groups to pursue their preferred one-state “solution”—a world where Israel is wiped off the map.
No Palestinian state to recognise
Contrary to the requirements of the Montevideo Convention, there is no agreement on what constitutes the land of Palestine because there are no internationally recognised boundaries. No process is in place (as was anticipated in the Oslo accords) to negotiate land swaps or establish a corridor between the West Bank and Gaza, or to negotiate over the status of East Jerusalem. In the 1990s, there was an understanding that these issues were complex and would take time to resolve. There is no such understanding today.
Pre-emptive recognition of a Palestinian state will therefore create an entity with no agreed form and impose on the inheritors of this territory a requirement to settle its shape when many of their citizens deny that even the concept of two states is a desirable outcome. Moreover, the Western desire to freeze the conflict by forcing a ceasefire on combatants means that an Israeli military victory cannot, by force of arms, determine boundaries. The outcome preserves the conflict rather than resolving it.
No viable Palestinian entity to act as a government
It seems that the Australian government position is to try to force the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah to take more responsibility for Gaza and to be the de facto government of a new Palestinian state. Albanese said of his August phone call with Abbas: “We as well want to see commitments from the Palestinian Authority, commitments of their governance reforms, of reforms in education, reforms across a whole range of issues.”
Abbas is in no position to make the reforms Australia has said he has agreed to make. Abbas has shown little interest or capacity to make such changes ever since the only election he faced, in 2005, to become head of the Palestinian Authority. The PA has had no influence in Gaza since the Hamas takeover in 2007. Abbas will be ninety in November. He is regarded as corrupt and out of touch by younger Palestinians and, more than likely in the next few months, will have to relinquish power to his current vice-president, Hussein al-Sheikh, or indeed to another leadership contender in the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. When Abbas dies or steps down, it is quite possible that a fight will break out for control of the Palestinian Authority. There is no identifiable “moderate” faction to suggest that the PA may become constructive stewards of a two-state solution.
There should be no doubt that Abbas will seek to broker the role Western governments want him to play, which is to provide a veneer of authority to accept the mantle of statehood that comes with recognition, and in all probability, money. Long a Holocaust denier—he wrote a PhD arguing that the Jews colluded with the Nazis to force immigration to Palestine—Abbas is incapable of steering his divided people towards a successful two-state solution.
Consider one commitment Abbas has apparently made to Albanese, which is to “demilitarise”. How is the PA going to impose that requirement on Hamas? The terrorist group has not given up arms after an extended fight with Israel. It is inconceivable that it would do so at the behest of the PA. The “commitment” to demilitarise is pure fantasy, but this will only become apparent well after Australian recognition has been granted.
A second Abbas commitment is to “hold general elections”. Abbas has a close to twenty-year record of avoiding elections, not least because of his growing unpopularity in the West Bank. Albanese says that “the Australian government has consistently made clear there can be no role for Hamas in a Palestinian state”. But what if Hamas contests an election in Gaza? It would probably win. How is Abbas supposed to keep Hamas out of such a process?
The Palestinian Authority’s incompetence and corruption
Having cast the Palestinian Authority as the inheritor of the Palestinian state, the risk for Australia is that we will be drawn more closely into the PA’s incompetence and corruption. Australia already maintains an office in Ramallah, which “enables Australia to engage on political, economic and social developments in the Occupied Palestinian Territories”.
In practical terms, this means handing over large volumes of aid. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade lists $174.5 million in aid “to support civilians impacted by conflicts in the [Middle East] region” since October 7, 2023. $53 million of this is earmarked for delivery to Gaza. DFAT maintains that the funding is provided through “established humanitarian partners, including UN agencies, and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, which have strong procedures in place to manage risks and comply with counter-terrorism financing and Australian sanctions laws”.
There is little information available to give confidence that the aid is being delivered as Australians would expect it to be. Indeed, a key Australian complaint is that aid is not being reliably delivered into Gaza. There remains serious international concern about the PA’s support for extremist ideology and in providing “pay-for-slay” payments to the families of terrorist “martyrs”. A US Council on Foreign Relations report in March this year identified new PA school textbooks that teach students that Jews control the world and that celebrate “jihad, terrorism and martyrdom” against Israelis.
In February this year, Mahmoud Abbas told the Fatah Revolutionary Council:
“We [the PA] again emphasise that we are proud of the sacrifices made by the Martyrs, prisoners, and wounded … I told you once, and I stand by my word. Even if we have [only] one penny left, it is for the prisoners and Martyrs. I will not agree, and you will not agree, to reduce any obligation, any interest, or any penny given to them.”
This contradicts Albanese’s claim that the PA will “terminate prisoner payments”. Whether Abbas is capable of making this change will only be proven after recognition is provided.
Hamas benefits from recognition, further harming Palestinians
Hamas officials have already claimed credit for Western governments moving to provide Palestinian recognition. On August 2 in Beirut, Ghazi Hamad, a member of the Hamas Political Office, said at a media conference that international interest in Palestinian statehood and the “fate of Palestinians” was only achieved through the terror group’s “resistance and the blow we dealt to Israel. Without our weapons, no one would be looking in our direction.” Hamad continued:
“For more than a decade, no one spoke with Abbas about a two-state solution or the establishment of a Palestinian state. All that was offered to the PA was humanitarian aid. We [Hamas] are the ones who brought the issue back to the forefront, and that is why all the countries are starting to recognise a Palestinian state.”
At one level, it is hard to disagree with Hamad’s assessment. Recognition will lift the terror organisation’s stock among the Palestinian people and increase rather than reduce the incentive to commit more terror acts. Recognition will, in effect, strengthen Hamas, better positioning the organisation to take control of the Palestinian state in the same way that it took control of Gaza eighteen years ago.
A strong Hamas will continue its brutal hold over the Palestinian people, allowing it to continue to brainwash the next generation of terrorists. This outcome is the direct opposite of what Western governments say they want.
It reduces the likelihood that the hostages will be released
A strengthened Hamas has no incentive to release the remaining Israeli hostages. The opposite is true: while Western pressure is heaped on Israel to cease military operations, the promise of major international recognition being provided to a Palestinian state in just a few weeks’ time tells Hamas there is no cost in continuing to hold the hostages. As this remains one of the few points of leverage Hamas has with the Israeli government, they will continue to keep people hostage while at the same time accruing rewards from the Western democracies.
This is certainly the view of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. On August 7, Rubio criticised France for derailing negotiations with Hamas over releasing hostages:
“…the talks with Hamas fell apart on the day Macron made the unilateral decision that he’s going to recognise the Palestinian state. And then you have other people come forward, other countries say, well, if there’s not a ceasefire by September, we’re going to recognise a Palestinian state.”
Australia will be among the “other people” Rubio has in mind.
It will isolate Israel and potentially lead to worse outcomes
A further risk is that the Netanyahu government will conclude that Britain, Australia, France, Canada and other democracies have become so focused on “delivering” recognition for Palestine that there is no point in Israel continuing to engage with these traditional friends. Albanese’s strained phone call with Netanyahu suggests that the once-valued bilateral relationship has sustained much damage.
This is both a sad and a perverse outcome. It’s sad because Australia once had what DFAT (now inaccurately) describes as “a warm and close relationship with Israel, which is supported strongly by Australia’s active Jewish community”. This was a relationship where governments could air differences and jointly make plans to deliver shared ideas. No longer. It’s a perverse outcome because the Australian expectation now seems to be that we can exercise more leverage over the Palestinian Authority than with the Israeli government.
In practice, Australia has let a traditional friend down. There is a risk that this will push the Netanyahu government towards more extreme military policies in Gaza, partly in the belief that there is nothing it can do to bring Western governments back into a more realistic dialogue about the future of Gaza.
It will damage our alliance with the United States
On a visit to New Zealand in August, Anthony Albanese was asked what impact the recognition of a Palestinian state would have on relations with President Donald Trump. As the Prime Minister often does, he responded with a regularly used talking point: “As a sovereign nation, we make our decisions.” Increasingly, he uses this as a coded way of saying he disagrees with Trump. The US remains Israel’s strongest ally, and while it does not uncritically endorse Netanyahu’s military actions, its support is steadfast.
The risk for Albanese is that he has Australia on an increasingly divergent path from our closest military ally and largest foreign investor, the United States. There had been a hope that a bilateral discussion with Trump might have happened in the margins of the United Nations’ High Level General Debate.
There is much for Albanese and Trump to discuss, including American views (shared by many Australian strategists, myself included) that Australia is significantly understating the defence threat we face, and too complacent about China’s military build-up. Other points of difference include the pace of AUKUS military projects, tariffs and climate policy. Now we can add recognition of Palestine. Trump told a media briefing on Air Force One in late July that he opposed recognition: “You’re rewarding Hamas if you do that. I don’t think they should be rewarded.”
Albanese is right to say that Australia will make its own sovereign decisions, but so too will the United States, and there is clearly a view forming in Washington that we are becoming a fickle, underperforming ally. Is this the best context for Albanese to seek a meeting with Trump in New York in September? Our military and security dependence on the US is deepening at precisely the moment Albanese wants to niggle American sensibilities on issues peripheral to our core interests.
It emboldens home-grown radicals
My final concern about recognising a Palestinian state now is that it will embolden but not satisfy a radical constituency in Australia, which has been lobbying for the pro-Palestinian cause since the Hamas attack in October 2023. Even accepting that many people who supported the march across the Sydney Harbour Bridge on August 3 were motivated by humanitarian concerns, many of those involved supported Hamas and Iran, waved terrorist flags and chanted death threats to Israeli defence personnel and threatened Israel generally.
Since October 2023, we have seen this movement become increasingly aggressive in our streets. Australian Jews have had their property attacked, and cars, synagogues and businesses damaged. Our government has been reluctant to intervene in ways that decisively separate Australian Jews from the conduct of a war in the Middle East. On the contrary, significant federal government effort has gone into appeasing these crowds—for example, announcing an additional $20 million of aid “in response to the catastrophe in Gaza” the day after the Harbour Bridge protest.
In my view, the extreme end of this protest movement will not be appeased by aid packages or recognition. Take Kym Davey, human rights advocate, former Chair of the South Australian Labor Party Platform Committee, a member of SA Labor Friends of Palestine and of Labor Against War. Davey’s considered position is that Hamas must not be excluded from political engagement because “history shows that enduring peace is made possible when all stakeholders are invited in”, and “Hamas is not regarded as a terrorist organisation by the overwhelming majority of UN-recognised states”.
Then there is the agenda of the Australia Palestine Advocacy Network. They would have Australia impose country-level sanctions on Israel, establish a two-way arms embargo, suspend all trade agreements with Israel and “reject any framework that conditions Palestinian self-determination on Israeli security”. I doubt the Albanese government would adopt these measures, but they will continue to be pressured to do so even if recognition takes place.
The Albanese government has got itself into a difficult bind. It is being pressed by activists, including many in its party, to adopt increasingly hard-line positions on Palestine that will not be tolerated by mainstream Australians. Recognition of a Palestinian state is now an inevitability at the UN in September, but the dilemma for Albanese is that this will do nothing to satisfy many of the bridge marchers.
Recognising Palestine in September hands Hamas a propaganda victory, entrenches the terrorists’ grip on Gaza, and fractures Australia’s relationships with Israel and the United States, but does nothing to bring peace, release hostages, or improve the lives of ordinary Palestinians. The decision is based on a confected hope that the Palestinian Authority is capable of disarming Hamas, holding elections, eliminating corruption and stepping forward to negotiate a peace settlement with Israel. None of that is remotely plausible. For a sovereign government, making our own decisions is a point of pride, but claiming sovereignty is no substitute for sensible strategy—and this decision is neither prudent nor principled.
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